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Abstract
In mixed health care systems a crucial condition for the success of Managed Care (MC)
plans is to win over a sufficient number of general practitioners (GPs) acting as gatekeep-
ers. This contribution reports on GPs’ willingness-to-accept (WTA) or compensation asked,
respectively, for changing from conventional fee-for-service to MC practice. Some 175 Swiss
GPs participated in discrete choice experiments which permit to put a money value on their
status quo bias. Regardless of whether effects coding or dummy coding is used to measure
status quo bias, Swiss GPs require at least 16 percent of their current average income to give
up fee-for-service in favor of MC practice.
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1 Motivation and Overview
Many governments try to limit the rise in health care expenditure by prescribing or encouraging
managed care (MC) programs. In mixed systems permitting choice, consumer participation in MC
can be encouraged by lowered contributions to health insurance [for evidence about the reduction
required to induce voluntary participation by consumers, see e.g. Zweifel et al. [2006]]. However,
health service providers must also be won over for MC lest these programs suffer from quality
problems, in particular due to a lack of participating physicians. This risk is of considerable
relevance in countries with a shortage notably of general practitioners (GPs), who play a crucial
role in MC as gatekeepers. In the case of Switzerland, only about 10 percent of medical students
intend to become GPs, while retiring GPs have difficulties finding a successor for their practice
(Buddenberg-Fischer et al. [2006]). Hence, health care reforms designed to foster MC need to
address the issue of sufficient attractiveness of MC practice particularly to GPs.
Incentives for providers to participate in MC programs are mixed. On the one hand, they
have to accept limitations of their professional autonomy, and possibly increased financial risk
(especially if they participate in the financial success of the scheme). On the other hand, they
can benefit from regular work hours, shared investment cost, and easier exchange of information
within a network. The present paper purports to provide information about GPs’ status quo
bias, expressed as their willingness to pay (WTP) for maintaining their conventional fee-for-service
practice, or compensation asked (willingness-to-accept WTA) for departing from it, respectively.
The evidence comes from market experiments of the discrete-choice type (DCEs), performed with
175 Swiss GPs in 2006. While evidence based on actual behavior would be preferable in principle,
market experiments can inform policy makers and health insurers about the chances of success of
planned changes, helping them avoid costly failures.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the existing literature
on GPs’ preferences, with special reference to evidence from DCEs. Section 3 presents hypotheses
concerning GPs’ status quo bias that can be derived from different strands of microeconomic
theory. Section 4 presents a short review of DCE as a tool for measuring WTP for an alternative
that is not (or not yet) available. The survey design is presented in Section 5, while Section 6
contains descriptive statistics and the results of the econometric estimation. Estimates of status
quo bias are derived and compared across age, income groups, and regions in an attempt to test
the hypotheses stated in Section 3. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
The existing literature on physician behavior mainly revolves around the impacts of different re-
imbursement systems (see Labelle et al. [1994], Pauly [1994], and McGuire [2000] for an overview).
The precise nature of physician preferences usually is not addressed because they do not seem
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to affect predictions in a substantial way. Some authors have nevertheless posited particular
preferences by including professional ethics (Feldstein [1970], Zweifel [1981], Dionne and Contan-
driopoulos [1985]). Attributes of professional activity originally received little attention, except for
the rate of return associated with specialization (Sloan [1971]). More recently, Gagne´ and Le´ger
[2005] have examined the choice of specialty in Canada from 1976 to 1991 in response to changes
in fee-for-service rates. They find income differences to be a significant factor. However, gender,
mother tongue, medical school attended, state laws, and geographic conditions have a bearing on
the choice of specialty as well. With the advent of MC, research into the determinants of choice of
type of medical practice received new impetus. Hypothesized attributes are reputation and status
(Enthoven [1978], Richardson [1981]), properties of the medical practice (Beardow et al. [1993]),
and intellectual satisfaction (Feldstein [1970], Enthoven [1978]). More recently, Kristiansen [1994]
has claimed professional autonomy to be an additional attribute that needs to be taken into con-
sideration. However, the relevance of these attributes, especially the non-pecuniary ones, has been
little investigated.
Against the background of undersupply in rural areas of Norway, Kristiansen [1992] analyzed
the determinants of the decision where to locate. Place of birth, place of residency, and spouse’s
place of origin were found to be significant factors. However, they are not of overriding importance,
permitting the author to conclude that the problem of underprovision could be solved through the
use of financial incentives. Non-pecuniary motives might be enhanced in order to relieve the public
budget, e.g. by favoring medical students with a rural background (who are particularly likely to
settle there). The same conclusion is drawn by Benarroch and Hugh [2004], who investigate the
migration of physicians in Canada. Urbanization has a significantly positive effect on migration,
whereas distance between major cities of a province has a significantly negative effect. While this
research is valuable for informing policy makers about what motivates physicians to opt for existing
alternatives, it is silent about their choices with regard to alternatives that are being considered
but not available yet. In this situation, surveys and market experiments can fill the gap.
The effects of non-pecuniary job characteristics on physicians’ labor supply decision have mainly
been studied in the psychological and medical literature (Scott [1998], using surveys). Of particular
importance for the present study, Buddeberg-Fischer and Klagho¨fer [2003] examine career paths
of 497 last-year medical students over a period of eight years in Switzerland. Respondents stated
versatility of the field (96 percent), intensive patient contact (87 percent), positive experiences
during their studies (86 percent), compatibility of work with family (83 percent), and possibilities of
self-employment (61 percent) as determinants of their choice of specialty. In addition, male students
exhibit a preference for specialties with a scientific orientation, whereas females, for settings with
intensive patient contacts. With regard specifically to MC alternatives, Nordt [2003] finds that
conflicts due to a changed perception of the physician’s professional role put a larger strain on
practitioners in solo than in group practice. Similarly, incompatibility of work and family may be
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more of a problem in solo practice (2.8 out of a maximum of 5 points) than in group practice (2.3
points, difference statistically not significant).
Market experiments of the discrete choice type (DCEs, see Section 4 below) have been performed
by Scott [2001] to investigate the preferences of practitioners in Great Britain with regard to
working hours, work load, time spent on administration per week, out-of-hours appointments, and
use of guidelines.
Performing a DCE as well, Ubach et al. [2003] report WTA values for an extra hour of and on
being on call as extra day per month. Wordsworth et al. [2004] find differences between principal
and so-called sessional GPs1. On the whole, the evidence is in accordance with the theoretical
predictions by Marinoso and Jelovac [2003], who compare the performance of gate-keeping and
traditional systems, emphasizing the importance of non-financial motives for the payment of GPs
to create favorable incentives.
While this research is valuable for pointing to job attributes that may be particularly valued
(or resisted) by GPs, it fails to inform about their attitudes with regard to non-marginal changes.
However, the transition from conventional fee-for-service to MC practice constitutes such a non-
marginal change. Health insurers and policy makers considering the introduction of MC need to
know what it takes to overcome the status quo bias likely characterizing GPs. With regard to
consumers, there is DCE evidence suggesting that status quo bias with regard to MC may be
substantial (Becker and Zweifel [2008]). It may well play an important role in physician choices as
well.
3 Hypotheses
This section is devoted to the development of hypotheses regarding status quo bias when the
alternative facing GPs is MC, with several job attributes changed (see Table 2 below).
Most GPs in Switzerland continue to work in traditional solo practice. This indicates a prefer-
ence for this setting because the MC alternative has been available for 15 years now. With average
GP age in the sample equal to 53 years (see Table 3 below), at least a minority of the GPs surveyed
could have opted for MC at the end of their medical training. They opted for solo practice although
this demanded a considerable investment of about one million CHF (at 2007 prices; 1 CHF = 0.8
US$ at 2007 exchange rates). If they were to opt for MC now, at least part of that investment
would be lost. These considerations lead to the first general hypothesis regarding general status
quo bias,
HALL: Swiss GPs exhibit a strong status quo bias.
An important determinant of status quo bias should be age, and for two reasons. The transition
to MC is an investment at least of time and effort involving uncertainty. Therefore, status quo bias
1 Principal GPs have ownerships in their practice, whereas sessional GPs are freelancers (mainly young females
with childcare responsibilities) and employees of NHS boards (Scotland).
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reflects a demand for security, which is determined by risk aversion and the amount of such volatility
(Pratt [1964]). Now both of these determinants may vary with age. With regard to risk aversion,
the empirical evidence is inconclusive (Bellante and Green [2004]; Halek and Eisenauer [2001];
Riley and Chow [1992]). However, with regard to asset volatility, the effect of age is unambiguous,
because the closer retirement age, the less time available for making up for an unexpected shortfall
of income that may be the consequence of a change to MC. Therefore,
HAGE: Preference for the status quo increases with the GP’s age.
A hypothesis regarding current labor income can again be derived from Pratt’s result that
maximum WTP for certainty is proportional to the product of the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion and the volatility of the asset to be protected. In the present context, it may be argued
that with increasing experience and hence labor income under the status quo, maximum probable
loss in terms of devaluation of acquired skills (occasioned by a change to MC) increases as well,
thus
HINCOME: Status quo bias is the more marked the higher current labor income.
While not fully exogenous, the type of catchment area should have a good deal of explanatory
power. Swiss GPs in rural areas still enjoy a good deal of status. Adhering to a MC organization
means a loss of autonomy and hence status. This effect is likely less marked in cities with their
anonymity, therefore
HURBAN: Status quo bias is lower in urban than in suburban and rural areas.
Switzerland is a culturally diverse country characterized by strong federalism. Health policy in
principle falls in the domain of cantons; however, health insurance is regulated at the federal level.
Accordingly, it was federal legislation that introduced MC in 1996 as a part of the new law on
health insurance (MC had been an option since 1992, based on a provisional exemption from the
any-willing-provider clause of the old law). Resistance against regulation at the federal level has
traditionally been particularly strong in the French-speaking west and the Italian speaking south,
which account for some 25 percent and 5 percent of the population, respectively. This resistance
was reflected in a DCE concerning MC-type restrictions in health insurance conducted among
consumers (Zweifel et al. [2006]). To the extent that physicians exhibit similar cultural differences
as their patients, one has
HWEST&SOUTH: Status quo bias is higher among GPs from the Western
and Southern than from the Eastern and Northern parts of Switzerland.
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4 Discrete Choice Experiments
4.1 Theoretical Background
Based on random utility theory (Luce [1959], Manski and Lerman [1977], McFadden [1981] and
McFadden [2001]), discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are designed to allow individuals to express
their preferences for non-marketed goods or goods which do not yet exist. The number of appli-
cations of DCEs to the valuation of healthcare programs has been increasing during the past few
years (see Ryan and Gerard [2003] and Scanlon et al. [1997]). In a DCE, individuals are given a
hypothetical choice between many or just two (binary choice) commodities. From these choices,
the importance (more precisely, the expected utility) of product characteristics can be inferred.
Inclusion of a cost or price attribute allows determining the money valuation of the remaining
product attributes. In the present context, the price attribute is labor income; therefore the DCE
amounts to estimating the compensating wage differentials as in labor economics. The fact that
respondents have to weigh several attributes simultaneously makes biases that plague Contingent
Valuation (where individuals are asked about their WTP directly, holding all other attributes
constant) less likely than in a DCE (Ryan [2004]).
The first step of a DCE involves the definition of the attributes of the commodity and the levels
assigned to them (Louvriere et al. [2000], Ryan and Gerard [2003]). Here, attributes of MC are
chosen to describe the GPs’ work situation (for more details, see Table 2). The price attribute
is the variation in monthly income. The total of five attributes and their levels combine to form
1,152 possible combinations of choice sets. Using the experimental design optimizing program
GOSSET (Kuhfeld and Tobias [1994], Hardin and Sloane [1993], Hardin and Sloane [1994]), the
number was reduced to 22 D-optimal choice sets and randomly split into two groups, resulting in
11 choices per respondent. Each of the 11 alternatives had to be evaluated against the status quo.
As a rational subject, a respondent will choose the alternative with the higher level of utility. The
decision making process within a DCE can thus be seen as a comparison of utilities Uni and Unj ,
Uni = Vni + εni, (1)
where Vni represents the deterministic indirect utility of individual n in alternative i and εni, an
error term. The individual chooses alternative i (MC) rather than the status quo j if
Uni > Unj ⇐⇒ Vni + εni > Vnj + εnj . (2)
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The component Vni(·) can be inferred from observed choices by assuming that the probability Pni
of choosing alternative i rather than j, given the vector of attributes, equals the probability of the
difference in utilities given in Equation (2) occurring. Therefore,
Pni = Prob(Uni > Unj , ∀j 6= i) (3)
= Prob(Vni + εni > Vnj + εnj , ∀j 6= i)
Rearranging this inequality leads to the following expression,
Pni = Prob(εnj − εni < Vni − Vnj , ∀j 6= i). (4)
Therefore, the probability of choosing i rather than j implies that the error term (εnj − εni) is
dominated by the systematic difference in utility (Vni− Vnj). The deterministic part of the utility
function is usually assumed to be linear in parameters2,
Vni = x′niβ, (5)
where β = (β0, ..., βK) is a vector of parameters to be estimated and xni is the vector containing the
levels of the K explanatory variables belonging to the each alternative. The parameters β1, ..., βK
can be interpreted as the marginal utilities of the attributes; they are constant in the case of a linear
utility function. This rather strong assumption might not be satisfied for attributes covering a wide
range such as hours of work or monthly income. To test for nonlinearity, quadratic terms of these
two regressors will be included in the empirical specification. The marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between two attributes k and m is given by
MRSk,m = − ∂Vni/∂xk
∂Vni/∂xm
, (6)
with the marginal utilities retrieved from the values of the estimated utility function (5). The
WTP for a specific attribute can thus be calculated by dividing the respective slope parameter of
the indirect utility function by the parameter pertaining to the income variable. This ratio then
indicates how much income respondents are willing to forego in order to get an increased amount
of attribute k.
The model defined by Equations (4) and (5) is usually estimated using Logit or Probit tech-
niques, depending on the assumption made concerning the distribution of the error term εni. Here,
the log-likelihood at convergence as well as the Akaike’s and Schwarz’s Bayesian information crite-
ria recommend the logit rather than the probit specification. Therefore, the εni are i.i.d. extreme
value distributed and the difference between two error terms (εnj − εni) is logistic distributed.
2 There is empirical evidence that a linear specification predicts well in the middle range of the utility function
(Hensher et al. [1999]).
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Since respondents have to make several choices, observations have a panel structure, making the
random-effects specification appropriate (for more details, see Louvriere et al. [2000] and Ben-Akiva
and Lerman [1985]).3
As Bech and Gyrd-Hansen [2005] state, the constant in a DCE may not represent pure status
quo bias if the utility function includes dummy-coded variables. The reason is that the intercept
usually is correlated with the dummies as it represents the reference category for the dummies.
Therefore, it is unclear whatever the estimated constant represents a reference point for the dum-
mies or the mean effect of unobserved determinants of utility. Louvriere et al. [2000], Ch.4, Bech
and Gyrd-Hansen [2005] propose the following solution to this problem, which they call effects
coding. Instead of creating L − 1 dummy-coded variables for an attribute with L levels, one as-
signs the value of -1 to the status quo level of each attribute and the value 1 to the presence of
another level (0 otherwise). The effects-coded variables are no longer correlated with the intercept
because the reference category is now coded -1 instead of 0. Table 1 illustrates using the attribute
treatment (explained in the next section) as an example. It has four levels (L = 4). Conventional
dummy coding is shown in panel A. Effects coding calls for putting the values for the status quo
level at -1 (panel B). This permits to distinguish between the real status quo (-1) and the absence
of some other level of the attribute in the alternative (0).
Attribute Levels A: Dummy coding B: Effects coding
treatment SDM CIR GL SDM CIR GL
j= 1 No obligations (status quo) 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1
2 Shared Decision Making (SDM) 1 0 0 1 0 0
3 Critical Incident Reporting (CIR) 0 1 0 0 1 0
4 Guidelines (GL) 0 0 1 0 0 1
Table 1: Dummy and effects coded variables
By construction, estimated coefficients of effects-coded variables differ from the dummy-coded
ones. Nevertheless, dummy-coded (dc) estimates can be derived from the effects-coded (ec) ones
as follows. First, the (ec) coefficient of the status quo level needs to be determined. In the example
above, this is the coefficient pertaining to No obligations (j = 1), given by βec1 =
∑4
j=2[−1 · βecj ].
Second, to obtain the (dc) coefficients, one has to take into account that a change from the status
quo to another level now amounts to a change from -1 to 1 rather than 0 to 1. Hence, in the case
of the coefficient for SDM (j = 2), one has
βdc2 = −1 · βec1 + 1 · βec2 = −1 ·
4∑
j=2
[−1 · βecj ] + 1 · βec2 . (7)
3 Estimating a fixed-effects model would necessitate the estimation of individual-specific constants, causing the
number of dummy variables to increase tremendously and hence problems of multi-collinearity. This would
also mean that individuals always consistently choose between the alternative and the status quo, ruling out
errors that are individual specific.
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As mentioned above, this coding scheme breaks the correlation between the intercept and the
attributes of the alternatives. The remaining value of the constant is due to the mean effect of
unobserved determinants of utility or the pure status quo bias, respectively.
5 Design of the study
The authors of this study were entrusted by Glaxo-Smith-Kline with organizing the continued
education of Swiss GPs in 2006. German-speaking physicians were invited to Hamburg (Germany)
and Madrid (Spain), while their French- and Italian-speaking colleagues met in Brussels (Belgium).
The main part of the program consisted in an analysis of the Swiss health care system by the
authors and a contrast provided by local health economists. At the end of the session, attendees
(about 20 per meeting) were asked to take part in the DCE reported here, totaling 181 from June
to November 2006. Since being informed about the status quo is essential for respondents to be
able to make choices4, they were given a sheet describing each scenario and attribute. The DCE
itself was preceded by questions about general attitudes concerning current health care issues,
satisfaction with participants’ professional situation, and their current work situation. After the
DCE, education, medical school attended, and other sociodemographic variables were surveyed.
In the DCE, participants were asked to compare the status quo with 11 hypothetical alternatives
defined by the five attributes listed in Table 2. Hence, the deterministic part of the utility function
Vni discussed in the previous section is given by
Vni = β0 + β1 · SDM + β2 · CIR+ β3 ·GL+ β4 ·QC + β5 ·RP + β6 ·HOURS (8)
+β7 · CALLS + β8 · FXS + β9 · PBR+ β10 · CAP + β11 · INC.
Beside treatment (with the four levels status quo, SDM, CIR, and GL), the attributes cooperation
(QC, RP) and remuneration (FXS, PBR, CAP) enter in both dummy and effects coded form.
Working hours per week (HOURS ) are defined as the percentage change from the stated current
value. Similarly, the days on call (CALLS ) are the absolute change from the status quo to each
alternative in days. Finally, INC is the change from the status quo in terms of labor income,
ranging from -4,000 to +4,000 CHF per month, or up to some 25 percent of average current
income (see Tables 2 and 3).
Initially, e-Health-card and remuneration with floating fee-for-service credit points had been
considered but were discarded. In view of the small sample size, randomly changing the order of
the choice alternatives to mitigate learning or fatigue effects was not considered. Since the number
of alternatives was rather high compared to recommendations in the literature, no alternative could
be included twice to check consistency.
4 See e.g. San Miguel and Amaya-Amaya [2005] for the importance of a priori information for choice consistency
in a DCE.
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Attribute Label Characteristic
Treatment concepts status quo No contractual obligation to adhere to a treatment concept
SDM Shared Decision Making
CIR Critical Incident Reporting
GL Need to follow guidelines
Cooperation status quo Limited to referrals to specialists and dispensing
prescription, only of a small amount of GPs work in
group practices
QC Mandatory attendance of quality circles once a month
RP Resource pooling with other GPs (accounting,
equipment, practice)
Weekly hours HOURS Percentage change from the stated current value.
of work GPs in Switzerland can choose their hours virtually free
of regulations.
Days on call CALLS Absolute change of days on call per month compared to
per month current situation.
Remuneration status quo Fee-for-service according to a nationwide schedule
(TARMED)
FXS Fixed salary equivalent to current monthly average income
PBR Partial budget responsibility equivalent to current
monthly average income
CAP Capitation, equivalent to current monthly average income
Income INC Monthly income change of -4000,-3000,-2000,-1000,+1000,
+2000,+3000, +4000
Table 2: Attributes of professional activity retained for the DCE
6 Results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
In Table 3, average age is a high 53 years (the same as the national figure, see Obsan [2007]),
pointing to a future shortage of GPs under unchanged conditions. With 21 years of experience,
participants are somewhat past their halftime in independent practice on average. Accounting for
15 percent of the sample, women are underrepresented in the sample compared to their overall
share of 33 percent in the medical profession and of 18 percent among GPs in independent practice
(FMH [2006]). About one-half of participants have children still living at home. About 40 percent
of the GPs surveyed have their practice in a rural environment and 51% are from the French-
speaking western and Italian-speaking southern parts of Switzerland and 49%, from the northern
and eastern parts. This amounts to an undersampling because the majority of the population is
German-speaking. The sample comprises 175 respondents because six GPs did not indicate their
region.
The monthly average income of CHF 16,173 (some $13,000 at 2007 exchange rates) corresponds
to the national average as reported by Hasler [2006]. Average working hours per week are lower
than official figures; this is due to the presence of part-time GPs in the sample. Days on call are
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less than four per month on average, with a maximum of 30 (see Table 3). Registering 148 patient
contacts per week on average, Swiss GPs are able to spend more time on a patient than e.g. their
German colleagues, who decry their need to practice ”3-minute-medicine”. Indeed, consultation
length averages 15 minutes in Switzerland but only 7 minutes in Germany (Deveugele et al. [2002]).
Finally, professional satisfaction was measured on a 1 (minimum) to 5 (maximum) scale, with an
average value of 3.6 points.
Quantiles
Variable Mean SD Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
Age in years 52.9 7.0 36 48 54 58 69
Experience in years 20.8 8.4 2 16 21 27 41
Sex (female=1) 0.8 0.4 0 1 1 1 1
Children present 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1 1
Urban 0.4 0.5 0 0 0 1 1
West&South 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1 1
Monthly income (in CHF) 16173.1 7089.9 2000 12500 15000 20000 53000
Working hours per week 54.3 12.9 20 46 55 60 100
Days on call per month 3.5 4.8 0 1 2 4 30
GP-patient contacts per week 147.9 66.7 40 100 135 180 450
Professional satisfaction 3.6 0.9 1 3 4 4 5
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
In the attitudinal part of the survey, most participants stated a very keen interest in health
economics as a reason to attend the workshop. This might give rise to selection effects because GPs
who are open to health economic issues might differ in terms of their preferences from the average
as well. Since invitation to the workshop was by sales representatives of Glaxo Smith Kline, other
selection effects may be present as well [notably a high volume of drugs sold on physicians’ own
account (which is legal in some cantons)].
6.2 Estimation results and testing of hypotheses
6.2.1 General results: the core model
Equations (4) and (5) constitute the simple core model traditionally used in DCEs, with marginal
utilities and hence WTP values independent of socioeconomic characteristics. Column 1 of Table
4 displays the results of the random-effects logit estimation for dummy-coded variables (Model A).
Column 2 shows the results of the same estimation using effects-coding (Model B). Status quo bias
values are calculated in analogy to Equation (6) and given in Table 5 below.
Model A is used as the benchmark for assessing signs and significance levels. While most
coefficients have the expected sign, some lack statistical significance. This is true in particular
of Critical Incident Reporting, Quality Circles, Resource Pooling, Hours, and Days on Call. The
last two observations are astonishing. Given that the work week is 54 hours on average under the
status quo (see Table 3), economic theory suggests that a (positive) percentage change in working
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Attributes Exp.sign Dummy-Coded Effects-Coded
Model A Model B Model C
R.E.Logit R.E.Logit Mixed Logit
Shared Decision Making – -0.539** -0.086 -0.086
(0.26) (0.16) (0.16)
Critical Incident Reporting – -0.202 0.251** 0.251**
(0.22) (0.13) (0.13)
Guidelines – -1.070*** -0.617*** -0.617***
(0.22) (0.14) (0.14)
Quality Circles +/– 0.061 -0.013 -0.013
(0.27) (0.17) (0.17)
Resource Pooling – 0.160 0.086 0.087
(0.16) (0.11) (0.11)
Working Hours – 0.110 0.110 0.107
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
Days on Call – 0.00263 0.00263 0.00280
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Fixed Salary + -0.814*** -0.195 -0.195
(0.22) (0.14) (0.14)
Partial Budgetary Resp. – -1.014*** -0.396** -0.396**
(0.27) (0.17) (0.17)
Capitation – -0.646*** -0.028 -0.028
(0.22) (0.14) (0.14)
Workshop No. 7 +/– 1.035*** 0.517*** 0.515***
(0.36) (0.18) (0.18)
Income + 0.000393*** 0.000393*** 0.000393***
(0.000027) (0.000027) (0.000027)
Constant -0.992*** -1.473*** -
(0.30) (0.20)
Constant [Mean of N(µ, σ2)] - - -1.474***
(0.19)
Constant [SD of N(µ, σ2)] - - 1.369***
(0.13)
Log-likelihood at convergence -791.37 -791.37 -791.42
Akaike IC 1610.75 1610.75 1610.83
Bayesian IC 1688.18 1688.18 1697.97
Observations: 1865
Number of GPs: 175
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Results of random-effects and mixed logit estimation
hours and additional days on call would be valued negatively. However, monthly income change
does prove relevant for choice, confirming its use as a price attribute. Finally, all the financial
attributes representing the way of remuneration are highly significant.
Table 4 also contains a dummy variable for workshop No. 7. In preliminary estimations,
workshop dummies were included in the regression to test for effects related to location, local
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presenter, and composition of the physician group. However, only workshop number 7 in Hamburg
showed a significant effect. While improving statistical fit, inclusion of this dummy hardly affects
the coefficients relating to the attributes.
Turning to the effects-coded estimates, one notices that the constant of model B points to a more
rather than less marked ‘net’ status quo bias, contrary to the findings of Bech and Gyrd-Hansen
[2005].
Model C in Table 4 shows the results of a mixed logit (MXL) model5 where the constant is
allowed to be normally distributed, while all other coefficients are kept fixed (see Train [2003],
Ch.6, and Hole [2007b]). This allows for taste heterogeneity among GPs; therefore, the status quo
bias could be positive for some GPs and negative for others. Further, the random-coefficient model
allows to calculate individual-specific values of the status quo bias (see Section 6.2.2 below). The
coefficients of model C do not deviate from those of model B since only the specification of the
constant is modified. In particular, the estimate of the constant is unaffected as the mean of its
normal distribution almost coincides with the values from model B. However, the significance of
the estimated standard deviation of the normal indicates that heterogeneity in status quo bias is
present.
Table 5 shows the willingness-to-accept (WTA) values for a change in the GPs’ overall job
specification. The values are calculated using Equation (6) and the estimates from Table 4.6 As
discussed above, the status quo bias gets even larger when effects-coding is applied, increasing from
2,524 to 3,808 CHF (model B) and 3,750 CHF per month (model C). These values correspond to
16, 24, and 23 percent of current average income. They support hypothesis HALL, which states
that Swiss GPs exhibit a strong status quo bias.
Model A Model B Model C
Dummy-coded Effects-coded
WTA Confidence Limits WTA Confidence Limits WTA Confidence Limits
2,523.8 991.9 / 4,055.8 3,808.4 3,124.0 / 4,492.8 3,750.0 2,738.0 / 4,762.0
The confidence limits are calculated using the delta method (see Hole [2007a])
Table 5: Compensation asked to overcome the status quo bias (CHF/month)
6.2.2 Distribution of status quo bias
The MXL estimates of Table 4 can be used for further investigations. First, the share of GPs with
positive status quo bias (S+) is given by S+ = Φ[−Mean/SD], with Φ(·) denoting the normal
5 The mixed logit model is also known as random-coefficient logit model.
6 The WTP confidence interval is given by WTP ± zα/2
√
var(WTP ) with
var(WTP ) = (−1/βˆINC)2var(βˆCONS) + (βˆCONS/βˆ2INC)2var(βˆINC)
+2(−1/βˆINC)(βˆCONS/βˆ2INC)covar(βˆCONS , βˆINC),
where βˆCONS and βˆINC are the estimates of the constant and the income attribute, respectively, and z is the
critical value of the inverse normal c.d.f. For more details see Hole [2007a]. The WTA confidence interval is
attained through changing the signs of the limits.
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cumulative density function. One obtains a share of 86 percent indicating that a transition from
fee-for-service to MC practice would have indeed to be compensated in the great majority of cases.
Second, the MXL estimates can be used to calculate individual-specific WTA (ISWTA) values
of status quo bias (see Train [2003], Ch.11, and Hole [2007b]). The kernel density distribution
of ISWTA values is depicted in Figure 1. Evidently, it can be approximated adequately by a
normal distribution, the distribution used in model C. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the sample mean of the ISWTA values equals the unconditioned mean resulting from the MXL
estimation. The two vertical reference lines in Figure 1 represent the status quo bias estimates
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Figure 1: Distribution of individual-specific WTA values
derived from models A (bellow the mode) and B (at the fitted mode), amounting to CHF 2,524
and 3,124, respectively (see Table 5).
6.2.3 Testing hypotheses with respect to status quo bias
To test the hypotheses concerning differences between GPs in term of their preferences for the
status quo, the core model of Section 6.2.1 needs to be extended by socioeconomic characteristics,
viz. Age, Curr-income, Urban, and West&South. Here, Curr-inc represents the respondents’
stated monthly income (in CHF). These characteristics are interacted with the constant to allow
for differences in status quo bias.
Table 6 is an extract of Table 7 (see Appendix). Being the price variable used for the calculation
of WTP, Income is included in models A and B, model C is not re-estimated because it already
allows for taste heterogeneity between the GPs.
The first hypothesis, HAGE (see Section 3) could not be tested directly. This would have called
for the inclusion of Age as an explanatory variable, which is highly correlated with Curr-inc,
causing severe multicollinearity. Estimating the extended model including Age instead of Curr-inc
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(not shown) reveals that preference for the status quo does increase with the GP’s age, indirectly
supporting HAGE.
Next, the sign of the coefficient for Curr-Inc indicates that the GPs who currently earn more
are particularly unwilling to accept any deviation from the status quo. This finding is consistent
with hypothesis HINCOME (see Section 3). A GP with a current monthly income 1,000 CHF in
excess of his or her peers has to be compensated with 146 CHF more to consider a transition to
MC practice.
As to hypotheses HURBAN and HWEST&SOUTH, Table 6 shows the two pertinent coefficients
to lack statistical significance. Therefore, these two hypotheses fail to receive empirical support.
Indeed, since the constant has no statistical significance anymore in both models A and B, GPs’
status quo bias can be fully explained either by their current income level or age.
Attributes Dummy-coded Effects-coded WTA
Model A Model B Estimate Conf. Interval
Income 0.000392*** 0.000392*** – –
(2.89e-05) (2.89e-05) – –
Curr-Inc -5.71e-05*** -5.71e-05*** 0.1456 (0.0384/0.2529)
(2.14e-05) (2.14e-05)
Urban -0.0499 -0.0250 127.2 (-1293.2/1547.7)
(0.284) (0.142)
West&South -0.211 -0.106 538.0 (-1005.9/2082.0)
(0.309) (0.154)
Constant (model A) 0.204 – -521.3 (-3146.4/2103.7)
(0.525) –
Constant (model B) – -0.528 1347.3 (-676.9/3371.5)
– (0.405)
Table 6: Extension of models A and B by including socioeconomic attributes
7 Conclusions
In mixed health care systems permitting choice, general practitioners (GPs) must be won over
for Managed Care (MC) practice. The objective of this contribution is to measure GPs’ status
quo bias in favor of conventional fee-for-service medicine. Based on a sample of 175 Swiss GPs
participating in discrete-choice experiments (DCEs), status quo bias would have to be overcome
by an average compensation amounting to at least CHF 2,524 (US$ 2,020 at 2008 exchange rates)
or 16 percent of average reported monthly income.
DCE results also point to considerable preference heterogeneity, which is remarkable in view
of the fact that all participants are GPs. As theoretically expected, status quo bias is particu-
larly marked for older and high-income GPs. No statistical differences are found between urban
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and suburban/rural GPs and between French- and Italian-speaking and German-speaking GPs,
contrary to maintained hypotheses.
The high values of status quo bias found [measured by willingness-to-accept (WTA) values]
may constitute overestimates for several reasons. First, participants were selected by the sales
representatives of the sponsoring pharmaceutical company. Therefore, they must be important
prescribers of the company’s products and likely of pharmaceuticals in general. This points to
considerable professional success under the status quo, inducing above-average WTA values for ac-
cepting changes. Second, the DCEs were preceded by a description of the respective host country’s
(Belgium, Germany, and Spain) health care system by a local expert. In all three countries, average
physician incomes are lower than in Switzerland (OECD [2008]. This may well have strengthened
participants’ status quo bias. Third, there is of course always the possibility of the DCE neglecting
attributes of physician practice that are positively correlated with status quo bias, resulting in an
overestimate of the latter. This risk is non-negligible in the present study since the sponsor would
not have consented to a pretest. As an imperfect substitute, the data from the first workshop were
immediately checked for signs of mis-specification of the DCE, without any indication to this effect
however.
For an assessment of the results of this paper, it should be borne in mind that they relate to GPs
with a well-established practice. The status quo bias values found therefore apply to an experienced
practitioner who typically would become the medical director of a MC organization rather than
a young GP who has to be won over for a MC plan. Still, savings achieved through modified
incentives have to be substantial to make MC viable in Switzerland, where health insurance is
individually contracted. MC plans since their inception in the early 1990s have never attained
a market share in excess of 10 percent because the premium reductions offered fall short of the
amounts estimated by Zweifel et al. [2006]. The amounts of compensation asked by GPs for
braking away from fee-for-service medicine in the reported magnitude will make the achievement
of attractive premium reductions for MC plans even more difficult in the future, preventing the
market share of MC from growing.
References
R. Beardow, K. Cheung, and W. Styles. Factors influencing the career choices of general prac-
titioner trainees in nowrth west thames regional health authority. British Journal of General
Practice, 143:449–452, 1993.
M. Bech and D. Gyrd-Hansen. Effects coding in discrete choice experiments. Healt Economics,
14(10):1079–1083, 2005.
K. Becker and P. Zweifel. Age and choice in health insurance: Evidence from a discrete choice
experiment. Patient, 1 (1):27–40, 2008.
REFERENCES 17
D. Bellante and C. Green. Relative risk aversion among the elderly. Review of Financial Economics,
13:269–281, 2004.
M. Ben-Akiva and S. Lerman. Discrete Choice Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1985.
M. Benarroch and G. Hugh. The interprovincial migration of canadian physicians: Does income
matter? Applied Economics, 36(20):2335–2345, 2004.
B. Buddeberg-Fischer and R. Klagho¨fer. Geschlecht oder Perso¨nlichkeit? Determinanten der
Karrierepla¨ne angehender A¨rztinnen und A¨rzte.(Gender or personality? Determination of career
plans of future physicians.). In A. Abele, E.-H. Hoff, and H.-U. Hohner, editors, Frauen und
Ma¨nner in akademischen Professionen. Berufsverla¨ufe und Berufserfolg, pages 17–28. Mu¨nchen,
2003.
B. Buddenberg-Fischer, R. Klaghofer, M. Stamm, F. Marty, P. Dreiding, M. Zoller, and C. Bud-
deberg. Primary care in Switzerland - no longer attractive for young physicians? Swiss Medical
Weekly, 136:416–424, 2006.
M. Deveugele, A. Derese, van den Brink-Muinen, J. Bensing, and J. De Maeseneer. Consultation
length in general practice: cross sectional study in six european countries. British Medical
Journal, 325:472–478, 2002.
G. Dionne and A. Contandriopoulos. Doctors and their workshops: a review article. Journal of
Health Economics, 4:21–33, 1985.
A. Enthoven. Consumer-choice health plan. New England Journal of Medicine, 298(22):1223–1238,
1978.
M. Feldstein. The rising price of physicians’ services. Review of Economics and Statistics, 52:
121–133, 1970.
FMH. A¨rztestatistik (Medical Statistics). www.fmh.ch, 2006.
R. Gagne´ and P. Le´ger. Determinants of physicians’ decision to specialize. Health Economics,
14(7):721–735, 2005.
M. Halek and J. Eisenauer. Demography of risk aversion. The Journal of Risk and Insurance,
68(1):1–24, 2001.
N. Hardin and A. Sloane. A new approach to the construction of optimal designs. Journal of
Statistical Planning and Inference, 37:339–369, 1993.
N. Hardin and A. Sloane. Operating manual for gosset: A general purpose program for constructing
experimental designs. 2nd edition, 1994.
REFERENCES 18
N. Hasler. Einkommensverha¨ltnisse der freien A¨rzteschaft in der Schweiz in den Jahren 2003 (neu)
und 2002 (Re-Evaluation). [Incomes of physicians in independent practice in Switzerland as of
2003 (new) and 2002 (re-estimation)]. Schweizerische A¨rztezeitung, 87(39):1677–1686, 2006.
D. Hensher, J. Louvrier, and J. Swait. Combining sources of preference data. Journal of Econo-
metrics, 89:197–221, 1999.
A. Hole. A comparison of approaches to estimating confidence intervals for willingness to pay
measures. Health Economics, 16:827–840, 2007a.
A. Hole. Fitting mixed logit models by using maximum simulated likelihood. The Stata Journal,
7, Number 3:388–401, 2007b.
I. Kristiansen. Medical specialists’ choice of location: the role of geographical attachment in
norway. Social Science and Medicine, 34(1):57–62, 1992.
I. Kristiansen. What is in the doctor’s utility function? a theoretical and empirical investigation
into what influences doctors’ decision making. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Tromso, 1994.
W. Kuhfeld and R. Tobias. Efficient experimental designs with marketing research applications.
Journal of Marketing Research, 31:545–557, 1994.
R. Labelle, G. Stoddart, and T. Rice. A re-examination of the meaning and importance of supplier-
induced demand. Journal of Health Economics, 13(3):347–368, 1994.
J. Louvriere, D. Hensher, and J. Swait. Stated Choice Methods. Analysis and Applications. Cam-
bridge: University Press, 2000.
D. Luce. Individual Choice Behavior. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1959.
C. Manski and S. Lerman. The estimation of choice probabilities from choice base samples. Econo-
metrica, 45(8):1977–1988, 1977.
B. Marinoso and I. Jelovac. GPs’ payment contracts and their referral practice. Journal of Health
Economics, 22(4):617–635, 2003.
D. McFadden. Economic choices. The American Economic Review, 91(3):351–378, 2001.
D. McFadden. Econometric models of probabilistic choice. In C. Manski and D. McFadden, editors,
Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Applications, pages 198–272. Cambridge, Mass.: The
MIT Press, 1981.
T. McGuire. Physician agency. In A. Culyer and J. Newhouse, editors, Handbook of Health
Economics, page Ch.9. N, North Holland, 2000.
REFERENCES 19
C. Nordt. Strukturwandel der medizinischen Grundversorgung. Ursachen und Wirkungen der
a¨rztlichen Arbeitszufriedenheit in unterschiedlichen Praxismodellen. (structural changes in pri-
mary medical practice. determinants and consequences of physicians’ job satisfaction in different
settings.). Phd dissertation, submitted for the Factulty of Philosophy, University of Zurich, 2003.
Obsan. Angebot und Inanspruchnahme an ambulaten medizinischen Leistungen in der Schweiz.
[Supply and utilization of ambulatory medical care in Switzerand]. Arbeitsdokument 22, Obsan,
Bern, 2007.
OECD. Health Data File. Paris, 2008.
M. Pauly. Editorial: A re-examination of the meaning and importance of supplier-induced demand.
Journal of Health Economics, 13:369–372, 1994.
J. Pratt. Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica, 32:122–136, 1964.
J. Richardson. The inducement hypothesis: That doctors generate demand for their own service.
In J. Van der Gaag and M. Perlman, editors, Health, Economics and Health Economics, pages
189–214. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1981.
W. Riley and K. Chow. Asset allocation and individual risk aversion. Financial Analysts’ Journal,
48(6):32–37, 1992.
M. Ryan. A comparison of stated preference methods for estimating monetary values. Health
Economics, 13(3):291–296, 2004.
M. Ryan and K. Gerard. Using discrete choice experiments to value health care programmes:
current practice and future reflections. Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, 2(1):55–64,
2003.
M. San Miguel, F.and Ryan and M. Amaya-Amaya. Irrational stated preferences: a quantitative
and qualitative investigation. Health Economics, 14(3):307–322, 2005.
D. Scanlon, M. Chernew, and J. Lave. Consumer health plan choice. Annual Review of Public
Health, 18:507–528, 1997.
A. Scott. Eliciting gps’ preferences fpr pecuniary and non-pecuniary job characteristics. Journal
of Health Economics, 20:329–347, 2001.
A. Scott. Giving things up to have more of others. the implications of limited substitutability
in eliciting preferences for health and health care. Discussion paper 01/98, Health Economics
Research Unit, University of Aberdeen, 1998.
F. Sloan. The demand for higher education: the case of medical school applicants. Journal of
Human Resources, 6(4):466–489, 1971.
REFERENCES 20
K. Train. Discrete Choice Models with Simulation. Cambridge: University Press, 2003.
C. Ubach, A. Scott, F. French, M. Awramenko, and G. Needham. What do hospital consultants
value about their job? a discrete choice experiment. British Medical Journal, 326:1432–1438,
2003.
S. Wordsworth, A. Skatun, A. Scott, and F. French. Preferences for general practice jobs: a survey
of principals and sessional gps. British Journal of General Practice, 54(507):740–746, 2004.
P. Zweifel. Supplier-induced demand in a model of physician behavior. In J. Van der Gaag and
M. Perlman, editors, Health, Economics and Health Economics. North-Holland Publishing Co.,
Amsterdam, 1981.
P. Zweifel, H. Telser, and S. Vaterlaus. Consumer resistance against regulation: the case of health
care. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 29(3):319–332, 2006.
REFERENCES 21
Appendix
Attributes Dummy-Coded Effects-Coded
Model A Model B
R.E.Logit R.E.Logit
Shared Decision Making -0.590** -0.0839
(0.277) (0.164)
Critical Incident Reporting -0.282 0.224*
(0.233) (0.136)
Guidelines -1.153*** -0.647***
(0.236) (0.146)
Quality Circles 0.156 0.0563
(0.293) (0.181)
Resource Pooling 0.142 0.0430
(0.173) (0.119)
Working Hours -0.215 -0.215
(0.436) (0.436)
Days on Call -0.00286 -0.00286
(0.0253) (0.0253)
Fixed Salary -0.870*** -0.279*
(0.235) (0.154)
Partial Budgetary Responsibility -0.881*** -0.290*
(0.283) (0.175)
Capitation -0.612*** -0.0216
(0.233) (0.148)
Workshop No.7 0.790* 0.395*
(0.446) (0.223)
Income 0.000392*** 0.000392***
(2.89e-05) (2.89e-05)
Curr-Inc -5.71e-05*** -5.71e-05***
(2.14e-05) (2.14e-05)
Urban -0.0499 -0.0250
(0.284) (0.142)
West&South -0.211 -0.106
(0.309) (0.154)
Constant 0.204 -0.528
(0.525) (0.405)
ln(σ2u) 0.583*** 0.583***
(0.207) (0.207)
Log-likelihood at convergence -688.748 -688.748
Observations: 1586
Number of GPs: 148
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Models A and B with socioeconomic attributes included
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